subject: The Virus Underground
posted: Tue, 10 Feb 2004 11:37:42 -0000


http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/08/magazine/08WORMS.html?pagewanted=1&e
i=5062&en=f03e8350a90218d0&ex=1076821200&partner=GOOGLE

February 8, 2004
The Virus Underground
By CLIVE THOMPSON


This is how easy it has become.

Mario stubs out his cigarette and sits down at the desk in his
bedroom. He pops into his laptop the CD of Iron Maiden's ''Number of
the Beast,'' his latest favorite album. ''I really like it,'' he
says. ''My girlfriend bought it for me.'' He gestures to the 15-year-
old girl with straight dark hair lounging on his neatly made bed, and
she throws back a shy smile. Mario, 16, is a secondary-school student
in a small town in the foothills of southern Austria. (He didn't want
me to use his last name.) His shiny shoulder-length hair covers half
his face and his sleepy green eyes, making him look like a very
young, languid Mick Jagger. On his wall he has an enormous poster of
Anna Kournikova -- which, he admits sheepishly, his girlfriend is not
thrilled about. Downstairs, his mother is cleaning up after dinner.
She isn't thrilled these days, either. But what bothers her isn't
Mario's poster. It's his hobby.

When Mario is bored -- and out here in the countryside, surrounded by
soaring snowcapped mountains and little else, he's bored a lot -- he
likes to sit at his laptop and create computer viruses and worms.
Online, he goes by the name Second Part to Hell, and he has written
more than 150 examples of what computer experts call ''malware'':
tiny programs that exist solely to self-replicate, infecting
computers hooked up to the Internet. Sometimes these programs cause
damage, and sometimes they don't. Mario says he prefers to create
viruses that don't intentionally wreck data, because simple
destruction is too easy. ''Anyone can rewrite a hard drive with one
or two lines of code,'' he says. ''It makes no sense. It's really
lame.'' Besides which, it's mean, he says, and he likes to be
friendly.

But still -- just to see if he could do it -- a year ago he created a
rather dangerous tool: a program that autogenerates viruses. It's
called a Batch Trojan Generator, and anyone can download it freely
from Mario's Web site. With a few simple mouse clicks, you can use
the tool to create your own malicious ''Trojan horse.'' Like its
ancient namesake, a Trojan virus arrives in someone's e-mail looking
like a gift, a JPEG picture or a video, for example, but actually
bearing dangerous cargo.

Mario starts up the tool to show me how it works. A little box
appears on his laptop screen, politely asking me to name my Trojan. I
call it the ''Clive'' virus. Then it asks me what I'd like the virus
to do. Shall the Trojan Horse format drive C:? Yes, I click. Shall
the Trojan Horse overwrite every file? Yes. It asks me if I'd like to
have the virus activate the next time the computer is restarted, and
I say yes again.

Then it's done. The generator spits out the virus onto Mario's hard
drive, a tiny 3k file. Mario's generator also displays a stern notice
warning that spreading your creation is illegal. The generator, he
says, is just for educational purposes, a way to help curious
programmers learn how Trojans work.

But of course I could ignore that advice. I could give this virus an
enticing name, like ''britney--spears--wedding--clip.mpeg,'' to fool
people into thinking it's a video. If I were to e-mail it to a
victim, and if he clicked on it -- and didn't have up-to-date
antivirus software, which many people don't -- then disaster would
strike his computer. The virus would activate. It would quietly reach
into the victim's Microsoft Windows operating system and insert new
commands telling the computer to erase its own hard drive. The next
time the victim started up his computer, the machine would find those
new commands, assume they were part of the normal Windows operating
system and guilelessly follow them. Poof: everything on his hard
drive would vanish -- e-mail, pictures, documents, games.

I've never contemplated writing a virus before. Even if I had, I
wouldn't have known how to do it. But thanks to a teenager in
Austria, it took me less than a minute to master the art.

Mario drags the virus over to the trash bin on his computer's desktop
and discards it. ''I don't think we should touch that,'' he says
hastily.


Computer experts called 2003 ''the Year of the Worm.'' For 12 months,
digital infections swarmed across the Internet with the intensity of
a biblical plague. It began in January, when the Slammer worm
infected nearly 75,000 servers in 10 minutes, clogging Bank of
America's A.T.M. network and causing sporadic flight delays. In the
summer, the Blaster worm struck, spreading by exploiting a flaw in
Windows; it carried taunting messages directed at Bill Gates,
infected hundreds of thousands of computers and tried to use them to
bombard a Microsoft Web site with data. Then in August, a worm called
Sobig.F exploded with even more force, spreading via e-mail that it
generated by stealing addresses from victims' computers. It
propagated so rapidly that at one point, one out of every 17 e-mail
messages traveling through the Internet was a copy of Sobig.F. The
computer-security firm mi2g estimated that the worldwide cost of
these attacks in 2003, including clean-up and lost productivity, was
at least $82 billion (though such estimates have been criticized for
being inflated).

The pace of contagion seems to be escalating. When the Mydoom.A e-
mail virus struck in late January, it spread even faster than
Sobig.F; at its peak, experts estimated, one out of every five e-mail
messages was a copy of Mydoom.A. It also carried a nasty payload: it
reprogrammed victim computers to attack the Web site of SCO, a
software firm vilified by geeks in the ''open source'' software
community.

You might assume that the blame -- and the legal repercussions -- for
the destruction would land directly at the feet of people like Mario.
But as the police around the globe have cracked down on cybercrime in
the past few years, virus writers have become more cautious, or at
least more crafty. These days, many elite writers do not spread their
works at all. Instead, they ''publish'' them, posting their code on
Web sites, often with detailed descriptions of how the program works.
Essentially, they leave their viruses lying around for anyone to use.


Invariably, someone does. The people who release the viruses are
often anonymous mischief-makers, or ''script kiddies.'' That's a
derisive term for aspiring young hackers, usually teenagers or
curious college students, who don't yet have the skill to program
computers but like to pretend they do. They download the viruses,
claim to have written them themselves and then set them free in an
attempt to assume the role of a fearsome digital menace. Script
kiddies often have only a dim idea of how the code works and little
concern for how a digital plague can rage out of control.

Our modern virus epidemic is thus born of a symbiotic relationship
between the people smart enough to write a virus and the people dumb
enough -- or malicious enough -- to spread it. Without these two
groups of people, many viruses would never see the light of day.
Script kiddies, for example, were responsible for some of the damage
the Blaster worm caused. The original version of Blaster, which
struck on Aug. 11, was clearly written by a skilled programmer (who
is still unknown and at large). Three days later, a second version of
Blaster circulated online, infecting an estimated 7,000 computers.
This time the F.B.I. tracked the release to Jeffrey Lee Parson, an 18-
year-old in Minnesota who had found, slightly altered and re-released
the Blaster code, prosecutors claim. Parson may have been seeking
notoriety, or he may have had no clue how much damage the worm could
cause: he did nothing to hide his identity and even included a
reference to his personal Web site in the code. (He was arrested and
charged with intentionally causing damage to computers; when his
trial begins, probably this spring, he faces up to 10 years in jail.)
A few weeks later, a similar scene unfolded: another variant of
Blaster was found in the wild. This time it was traced to a college
student in Romania who had also left obvious clues to his identity in
the code.

This development worries security experts, because it means that
virus-writing is no longer exclusively a high-skill profession. By so
freely sharing their work, the elite virus writers have made it easy
for almost anyone to wreak havoc online. When the damage occurs, as
it inevitably does, the original authors just shrug. We may have
created the monster, they'll say, but we didn't set it loose. This
dodge infuriates security professionals and the police, who say it is
legally precise but morally corrupt. ''When they publish a virus
online, they know someone's going to release it,'' says Eugene
Spafford, a computer-science professor and security expert at Purdue
University. Like a collection of young Dr. Frankensteins, the virus
writers are increasingly creating forces they cannot control -- and
for which they explicitly refuse to take responsibility.


"Where's the beer?'' Philet0ast3r wondered.

An hour earlier, he had dispatched three friends to pick up another
case, but they were nowhere in sight. He looked out over the
controlled chaos of his tiny one-bedroom apartment in small-town
Bavaria. (Most of the virus writers I visited live in Europe; there
have been very few active in the United States since 9/11, because of
fears of prosecution.) Philet0ast3r's party was crammed with 20
friends who were blasting the punk band Deftones, playing cards,
smoking furiously and arguing about politics. It was a Saturday
night. Three girls sat on the floor, rolling another girl's hair into
thick dreadlocks, the hairstyle of choice among the crowd.
Philet0ast3r himself -- a 21-year-old with a small silver hoop
piercing his lower lip -- wears his brown hair in thick dreads.
(Philet0ast3r is an online handle; he didn't want me to use his
name.)

Philet0ast3r's friends finally arrived with a fresh case of ale, and
his blue eyes lit up. He flicked open a bottle using the edge of his
cigarette lighter and toasted the others. A tall blond friend in a
jacket festooned with anti-Nike logos put his arm around Philet0ast3r
and beamed.

''This guy,'' he proclaimed, ''is the best at Visual Basic.''

In the virus underground, that's love. Visual Basic is a computer
language popular among malware authors for its simplicity;
Philet0ast3r has used it to create several of the two dozen viruses
he's written. From this tiny tourist town, he works as an assistant
in a home for the mentally disabled and in his spare time runs an
international virus-writers' group called the ''Ready Rangers
Liberation Front.'' He founded the group three years ago with a few
bored high-school friends in his even tinier hometown nearby. I met
him, like everyone profiled in this article, online, first e-mailing
him, then chatting in an Internet Relay Chat channel where virus
writers meet and trade tips and war stories.

Philet0ast3r got interested in malware the same way most virus
authors do: his own computer was hit by a virus. He wanted to know
how it worked and began hunting down virus-writers' Web sites. He
discovered years' worth of viruses online, all easily downloadable,
as well as primers full of coding tricks. He spent long evenings
hanging out in online chat rooms, asking questions, and soon began
writing his own worms.

One might assume Philet0ast3r would favor destructive viruses, given
the fact that his apartment is decorated top-to-bottom with
anticorporate stickers. But Philet0ast3r's viruses, like those of
many malware writers, are often surprisingly mild things carrying
goofy payloads. One worm does nothing but display a picture of a
raised middle finger on your computer screen, then sheepishly
apologize for the gesture. (''Hey, this is not meant to you! I just
wanted to show my payload.'') Another one he is currently developing
will install two artificial intelligence chat-agents on your
computer; they appear in a pop-up window, talking to each other
nervously about whether your antivirus software is going to catch and
delete them. Philet0ast3r said he was also working on something
sneakier: a ''keylogger.'' It's a Trojan virus that monitors every
keystroke its victim types -- including passwords and confidential e-
mail messages -- then secretly mails out copies to whoever planted
the virus. Anyone who spreads this Trojan would be able to quickly
harvest huge amounts of sensitive personal information.

Technically, ''viruses'' and ''worms'' are slightly different things.
When a virus arrives on your computer, it disguises itself. It might
look like an OutKast song (''hey--ya.mp3''), but if you look more
closely, you'll see it has an unusual suffix, like ''hey--
ya.mp3.exe.'' That's because it isn't an MP3 file at all. It's a tiny
program, and when you click on it, it will reprogram parts of your
computer to do something new, like display a message. A virus cannot
kick-start itself; a human needs to be fooled into clicking on it.
This turns virus writers into armchair psychologists, always hunting
for new tricks to dupe someone into activating a virus. (''All virus-
spreading,'' one virus writer said caustically, ''is based on the
idiotic behavior of the users.'')

Worms, in contrast, usually do not require any human intervention to
spread. That means they can travel at the breakneck pace of computers
themselves. Unlike a virus, a worm generally does not alter or
destroy data on a computer. Its danger lies in its speed: when a worm
multiplies, it often generates enough traffic to brown out Internet
servers, like air-conditioners bringing down the power grid on a hot
summer day. The most popular worms today are ''mass mailers,'' which
attack a victim's computer, swipe the addresses out of Microsoft
Outlook (the world's most common e-mail program) and send a copy of
the worm to everyone in the victim's address book. These days, the
distinction between worm and virus is breaking down. A worm will
carry a virus with it, dropping it onto the victim's hard drive to do
its work, then e-mailing itself off to a new target.

The most ferocious threats today are ''network worms,'' which exploit
a particular flaw in a software product (often one by Microsoft). The
author of Slammer, for example, noticed a flaw in Microsoft's SQL
Server, an online database commonly used by businesses and
governments. The Slammer worm would find an unprotected SQL server,
then would fire bursts of information at it, flooding the server's
data ''buffer,'' like a cup filled to the brim with water. Once its
buffer was full, the server could be tricked into sending out
thousands of new copies of the worm to other servers. Normally, a
server should not allow an outside agent to control it that way, but
Microsoft had neglected to defend against such an attack. Using that
flaw, Slammer flooded the Internet with 55 million blasts of data per
second and in only 10 minutes colonized almost all vulnerable
machines. The attacks slowed the 911 system in Bellevue, Wash., a
Seattle suburb, to such a degree that operators had to resort to a
manual method of tracking calls.

Philet0ast3r said he isn't interested in producing a network worm,
but he said it wouldn't be hard if he wanted to do it. He would scour
the Web sites where computer-security professionals report any new
software vulnerabilities they discover. Often, these security white
papers will explain the flaw in such detail that they practically
provide a road map on how to write a worm that exploits it. ''Then I
would use it,'' he concluded. ''It's that simple.''

Computer-science experts have a phrase for that type of fast-
spreading epidemic: ''a Warhol worm,'' in honor of Andy Warhol's
prediction that everyone would be famous for 15 minutes. ''In
computer terms, 15 minutes is a really long time,'' says Nicholas
Weaver, a researcher at the International Computer Science Institute
in Berkeley, who coined the Warhol term. ''The worm moves faster than
humans can respond.'' He suspects that even more damaging worms are
on the way. All a worm writer needs to do is find a significant new
flaw in a Microsoft product, then write some code that exploits it.
Even Microsoft admits that there are flaws the company doesn't yet
know about.

Virus writers are especially hostile toward Microsoft, the perennial
whipping boy of the geek world. From their (somewhat self-serving)
point of view, Microsoft is to blame for the worm epidemic, because
the company frequently leaves flaws in its products that allow
malware to spread. Microsoft markets its products to less expert
computer users, cultivating precisely the sort of gullible victims
who click on disguised virus attachments. But it is Microsoft's
success that really makes it such an attractive target: since more
than 90 percent of desktop computers run Windows, worm writers target
Microsoft in order to hit the largest possible number of victims. (By
relying so exclusively on Microsoft products, virus authors say, we
have created a digital monoculture, a dangerous thinning of the
Internet's gene pool.)

Microsoft officials disagree that their programs are poor quality, of
course. And it is also possible that their products are targeted
because it has become cool to do so. ''There's sort of a natural
tendency to go after the biggest dog,'' says Phil Reitinger, senior
security strategist for Microsoft. Reitinger says that the company is
working to make its products more secure. But Microsoft is now so
angry that it has launched a counterattack. Last fall, Microsoft set
up a $5 million fund to pay for information leading to the capture of
writers who target Windows machines. So far, the company has
announced $250,000 bounties for the creators of Blaster, Sobig.F and
Mydoom.B.


The motivations of the top virus writers can often seem paradoxical.
They spend hours dreaming up new strategies to infect computers, then
hours more bringing them to reality. Yet when they're done, most of
them say they have little interest in turning their creations free.
(In fact, 99 percent of all malware never successfully spreads in the
wild, either because it expressly wasn't designed to do so or because
the author was inept and misprogrammed his virus.) Though
Philet0ast3r is proud of his keylogger, he said he does not intend to
release it into the wild. His reason is partly one of self-
protection; he wouldn't want the police to trace it back to him. But
he also said he does not ethically believe in damaging someone else's
computer.

So why write a worm, if you're not going to spread it?

For the sheer intellectual challenge, Philet0ast3r replied, the fun
of producing something ''really cool.'' For the top worm writers, the
goal is to make something that's brand-new, never seen before.
Replicating an existing virus is ''lame,'' the worst of all possible
insults. A truly innovative worm, Philet0ast3r said, ''is like art.''
To allow his malware to travel swiftly online, the virus writer must
keep its code short and efficient, like a poet elegantly packing as
much creativity as possible into the tight format of a sonnet. ''One
condition of art,'' he noted, ''is doing good things with less.''

When he gets stuck on a particularly thorny problem, Philet0ast3r
will sometimes call for help from other members of the Ready Rangers
Liberation Front (which includes Mario). Another friend in another
country, whom Philet0ast3r has never actually met, is helping him
complete his keylogger by writing a few crucial bits of code that
will hide the tool from its victim's view. When they're done, they'll
publish their invention in their group's zine, a semiannual anthology
of the members' best work.

The virus scene is oddly gentlemanly, almost like the amateur
scientist societies of Victorian Britain, where colleagues presented
papers in an attempt to win that most elusive of social currencies:
street cred. In fact, I didn't meet anyone who gloated about his own
talent until I met Benny. He is a member of 29A, a super-elite cadre
within the virus underground, a handful of coders around the world
whose malware is so innovative that even antivirus experts grudgingly
admit they're impressed. Based in the Czech Republic, Benny, clean-
cut and wide-eyed, has been writing viruses for five years, making
him a veteran in the field at age 21. ''The main thing that I'm most
proud of, and that no one else can say, is that I always come up with
a new idea,'' he said, ushering me into a bedroom so neat that it
looked as if he'd stacked his magazines using a ruler and level.
''Each worm shows something different, something new that hadn't been
done before by anyone.''

Benny -- that's his handle, not his real name -- is most famous for
having written a virus that infected Windows 2000 two weeks before
Windows 2000 was released. He'd met a Microsoft employee months
earlier who boasted that the new operating system would be ''more
secure than ever''; Benny wrote (but says he didn't release) the
virus specifically to humiliate the company. ''Microsoft,'' he said
with a laugh, ''wasn't enthusiastic.'' He also wrote Leviathan, the
first virus to use ''multithreading,'' a technique that makes the
computer execute several commands at once, like a juggler handling
multiple balls. It greatly speeds up the pace at which viruses can
spread. Benny published that invention in his group's zine, and now
many of the most virulent bugs have adopted the technique, including
last summer's infamous Sobig.F.

For a virus author, a successful worm brings the sort of fame that a
particularly daring piece of graffiti used to produce: the author's
name, automatically replicating itself in cyberspace. When antivirus
companies post on their Web sites a new ''alert'' warning of a fresh
menace, the thrill for the author is like getting a great book
review: something to crow about and e-mail around to your friends.
Writing malware, as one author e-mailed me, is like creating
artificial life. A virus, he wrote, is ''a humble little creature
with only the intention to avoid extinction and survive.''

Quite apart from the intellectual fun of programming, though, the
virus scene is attractive partly because it's very social. When
Philet0ast3r drops by a virus-writers chat channel late at night
after work, the conversation is as likely to be about music, politics
or girls as the latest in worm technology. ''They're not talking
about viruses -- they're talking about relationships or ordering
pizza,'' says Sarah Gordon, a senior research fellow at Symantec, an
antivirus company, who is one of the only researchers in the world
who has interviewed hundreds of virus writers about their
motivations. Very occasionally, malware authors even meet up face to
face for a party; Philet0ast3r once took a road trip for a beer-
addled weekend of coding, and when I visited Mario, we met up with
another Austrian virus writer and discussed code for hours at a bar.

The virus community attracts a lot of smart but alienated young men,
libertarian types who are often flummoxed by the social nuances of
life. While the virus scene isn't dominated by those characters, it
certainly has its share -- and they are often the ones with a genuine
chip on their shoulder.

''I am a social reject,'' admitted Vorgon (as he called himself), a
virus writer in Toronto with whom I exchanged messages one night in
an online chat channel. He studied computer science in college but
couldn't find a computer job after sending out 400 resumes. With ''no
friends, not much family'' and no girlfriend for years, he became
depressed. He attempted suicide, he said, by walking out one frigid
winter night into a nearby forest for five hours with no jacket on.
But then he got into the virus-writing scene and found a community.
''I met a lot of cool people who were interested in what I did,'' he
wrote. ''They made me feel good again.'' He called his first virus
FirstBorn to celebrate his new identity. Later, he saw that one of
his worms had been written up as an alert on an antivirus site, and
it thrilled him. ''Kinda like when I got my first girlfriend,'' he
wrote. ''I was god for a couple days.'' He began work on another
worm, trying to recapture the feeling. ''I spent three months working
on it just so I could have those couple of days of godliness.''

Vorgon is still angry about life. His next worm, he wrote, will try
to specifically target the people who wouldn't hire him. It will have
a ''spidering'' engine that crawls Web-page links, trying to find
likely e-mail addresses for human-resource managers, ''like
[email protected], for example.'' Then it will send them a fake
resume infected with the worm. (He hasn't yet decided on a payload,
and he hasn't ruled out a destructive one.) ''This is a revenge
worm,'' he explained -- for ''not hiring me, and hiring some loser
that is not even half the programmer I am.''


Many people might wonder why virus writers aren't simply rounded up
and arrested for producing their creations. But in most countries,
writing viruses is not illegal. Indeed, in the United States some
legal scholars argue that it is protected as free speech. Software is
a type of language, and writing a program is akin to writing a recipe
for beef stew. It is merely a bunch of instructions for the computer
to follow, in the same way that a recipe is a set of instructions for
a cook to follow. A virus or worm becomes illegal only when it is
activated -- when someone sends it to a victim and starts it
spreading in the wild, and it does measurable damage to computer
systems. The top malware authors are acutely aware of this
distinction. Most every virus-writer Web site includes a disclaimer
stating that it exists purely for educational purposes, and that if a
visitor downloads a virus to spread, the responsibility is entirely
the visitor's. Benny's main virus-writing computer at home has no
Internet connection at all; he has walled it off like an airlocked
biological-weapons lab, so that nothing can escape, even by accident.


Virus writers argue that they shouldn't be held accountable for other
people's actions. They are merely pursuing an interest in writing
self-replicating computer code. ''I'm not responsible for people who
do silly things and distribute them among their friends,'' Benny said
defiantly. ''I'm not responsible for those. What I like to do is
programming, and I like to show it to people -- who may then do
something with it.'' A young woman who goes by the handle Gigabyte
told me in an online chat room that if the authorities wanted to
arrest her and other virus writers, then ''they should arrest the
creators of guns as well.''

One of the youngest virus writers I visited was Stephen Mathieson, a
16-year-old in Detroit whose screen name is Kefi. He also belongs to
Philet0ast3r's Ready Rangers Liberation Front. A year ago, Mathieson
became annoyed when he found members of another virus-writers group
called Catfish_VX plagiarizing his code. So he wrote Evion, a worm
specifically designed to taunt the Catfish guys. He put it up on his
Web site for everyone to see. Like most of Mathieson's work, the worm
had no destructive intent. It merely popped up a few cocky messages,
including: Catfish_VX are lamers. This virus was constructed for them
to steal.

Someone did in fact steal it, because pretty soon Mathieson heard
reports of it being spotted in the wild. To this day, he does not
know who circulated Evion. But he suspects it was probably a random
troublemaker, a script kiddie who swiped it from his site. ''The
kids,'' he said, shaking his head, ''just cut and paste.''

Quite aside from the strangeness of listening to a 16-year-old
complain about ''the kids,'' Mathieson's rhetoric glosses over a
charged ethical and legal debate. It is tempting to wonder if the
leading malware authors are lying -- whether they do in fact
circulate their worms on the sly, obsessed with a desire to see
whether they will really work. While security officials say that may
occasionally happen, they also say the top virus writers are quite
likely telling the truth. ''If you're writing important virus code,
you're probably well trained,'' says David Perry, global director of
education for Trend Micro, an antivirus company. ''You know a number
of tricks to write good code, but you don't want to go to prison. You
have an income and stuff. It takes someone unaware of the
consequences to release a virus.''

But worm authors are hardly absolved of blame. By putting their code
freely on the Web, virus writers essentially dangle temptation in
front of every disgruntled teenager who goes online looking for a way
to rebel. A cynic might say that malware authors rely on clueless
script kiddies the same way that a drug dealer uses 13-year-olds to
carry illegal goods -- passing the liability off to a hapless mule.

''You've got several levels here,'' says Marc Rogers, a former police
officer who now researches computer forensics at Purdue University.
''You've got the guys who write it, and they know they shouldn't
release it because it's illegal. So they put it out there knowing
that some script kiddie who wants to feel like a big shot in the
virus underground will put it out. They know these neophytes will
jump on it. So they're grinning ear to ear, because their baby, their
creation, is out there. But they didn't officially release it, so
they don't get in trouble.'' He says he thinks that the original
authors are just as blameworthy as the spreaders.

Sarah Gordon of Symantec also says the authors are ethically naive.
''If you're going to say it's an artistic statement, there are more
responsible ways to be artistic than to create code that costs people
millions,'' she says. Critics like Reitinger, the Microsoft security
chief, are even harsher. ''To me, it's online arson,'' he says.
''Launching a virus is no different from burning down a building.
There are people who would never toss a Molotov cocktail into a
warehouse, but they wouldn't think for a second about launching a
virus.''

What makes this issue particularly fuzzy is the nature of computer
code. It skews the traditional intellectual question about studying
dangerous topics. Academics who research nuclear-fission techniques,
for example, worry that their research could help a terrorist make a
weapon. Many publish their findings anyway, believing that the mere
knowledge of how fission works won't help Al Qaeda get access to
uranium or rocket parts.

But computer code is a different type of knowledge. The code for a
virus is itself the weapon. You could read it in the same way you
read a book, to help educate yourself about malware. Or you could set
it running, turning it instantly into an active agent. Computer code
blurs the line between speech and act. ''It's like taking a gun and
sticking bullets in it and sitting it on the counter and saying,
'Hey, free gun!''' Rogers says.

Some academics have pondered whether virus authors could be charged
under conspiracy laws. Creating a virus, they theorize, might be
considered a form of abetting a crime by providing materials. Ken
Dunham, the head of ''malicious code intelligence'' for iDefense, a
computer security company, notes that there are certainly many
examples of virus authors assisting newcomers. He has been in chat
rooms, he says, ''where I can see people saying, 'How can I find
vulnerable hosts?' And another guy says, 'Oh, go here, you can use
this tool.' They're helping each other out.''

There are virus writers who appreciate these complexities. But they
are certain that the viruses they write count as protected speech.
They insist they have a right to explore their interests. Indeed, a
number of them say they are making the world a better place, because
they openly expose the weaknesses of computer systems. When
Philet0ast3r or Mario or Mathieson finishes a new virus, they say,
they will immediately e-mail a copy of it to antivirus companies.
That way, they explained, the companies can program their software to
recognize and delete the virus should some script kiddie ever release
it into the wild. This is further proof that they mean no harm with
their hobby, as Mathieson pointed out. On the contrary, he said,
their virus-writing strengthens the ''immune system'' of the
Internet.

These moral nuances fall apart in the case of virus authors who are
themselves willing to release worms into the wild. They're more rare,
for obvious reasons. Usually they are overseas, in countries where
the police are less concerned with software crimes. One such author
is Melhacker, a young man who reportedly lives in Malaysia and has
expressed sympathy for Osama bin Laden. Antivirus companies have
linked him to the development of several worms, including one that
claims to come from the ''Qaeda network.'' Before the Iraq war, he
told a computer magazine that he would release a virulent worm if the
United States attacked Iraq -- a threat that proved hollow. When I e-
mailed him, he described his favorite type of worm payload: ''Stolen
information from other people.'' He won't say which of his viruses he
has himself spread and refuses to comment on his connection to the
Qaeda worm. But in December on Indovirus.net, a discussion board for
virus writers, Melhacker urged other writers to ''try to make it in
the wild'' and to release their viruses in cybercafes, presumably to
avoid detection. He also told them to stop sending in their work to
antivirus companies.

Mathieson wrote a critical post in response, arguing that a good
virus writer shouldn't need to spread his work. Virus authors are, in
fact, sometimes quite chagrined when someone puts a dangerous worm
into circulation, because it can cause a public backlash that hurts
the entire virus community. When the Melissa virus raged out of
control in 1999, many Internet service providers immediately shut
down the Web sites of malware creators. Virus writers stormed online
to pillory the Melissa author for turning his creation loose. ''We
don't need any more grief,'' one wrote.


If you ask cyberpolice and security experts about their greatest
fears, they are not the traditional virus writers, like Mario or
Philet0ast3r or Benny. For better or worse, those authors are a known
quantity. What keeps antivirus people awake at night these days is an
entirely new threat: worms created for explicit criminal purposes.

These began to emerge last year. Sobig in particular alarmed virus
researchers. It was released six separate times throughout 2003, and
each time the worm was programmed to shut itself off permanently
after a few days or weeks. Every time the worm appeared anew, it had
been altered in a way that suggested a single author had been
tinkering with it, observing its behavior in the wild, then killing
off his creation to prepare a new and more insidious version. ''It
was a set of very well-controlled experiments,'' says Mikko Hypponen,
the director of antivirus research at F-Secure, a computer security
company. ''The code is high quality. It's been tested well. It really
works in the real world.'' By the time the latest variant, Sobig.F,
appeared in August, the worm was programmed to install a back door
that would allow the author to assume control of the victim's
computer. To what purpose? Experts say its author has used the
captured machines to send spam and might also be stealing financial
information from the victims' computers.

No one has any clue who wrote Sobig. The writers of this new class of
worm leave none of the traces of their identities that malware
authors traditionally include in their code, like their screen names
or ''greetz,'' shout-out hellos to their cyberfriends. Because
criminal authors actively spread their creations, they are cautious
about tipping their hand. ''The F.B.I. is out for the Sobig guy with
both claws, and they want to make an example of him,'' David Perry
notes. ''He's not going to mouth off.'' Dunham of iDefense says his
online research has turned up ''anecdotal evidence'' that the Sobig
author comes from Russia or elsewhere in Europe. Others suspect China
or other parts of Asia. It seems unlikely that Sobig came from the
United States, because American police forces have been the most
proactive of any worldwide in hunting those who spread malware. Many
experts believe the Sobig author will release a new variant sometime
this year.

Sobig was not alone. A variant of the Mimail worm, which appeared
last spring, would install a fake pop-up screen on a computer
pretending to be from PayPal, an online e-commerce firm. It would
claim that PayPal had lost the victim's credit-card or banking
details and ask him to type it in again. When he did, the worm would
forward the information to the worm's still-unknown author. Another
worm, called Bugbear.B, was programmed to employ sophisticated
password-guessing strategies at banks and brokerages to steal
personal information. ''It was specifically designed to target
financial institutions,'' said Vincent Weafer, senior director of
Symantec.

The era of the stealth worm is upon us. None of these pieces of
malware were destructive or designed to cripple the Internet with too
much traffic. On the contrary, they were designed to be unobtrusive,
to slip into the background, the better to secretly harvest data.
Five years ago, the biggest danger was the ''Chernobyl'' virus, which
deleted your hard drive. But the prevalence of hard-drive-destroying
viruses has steadily declined to almost zero. Malware authors have
learned a lesson that biologists have long known: the best way for a
virus to spread is to ensure its host remains alive.

''It's like comparing Ebola to AIDS,'' says Joe Wells, an antivirus
researcher and founder of WildList, a long-established virus-tracking
group. ''They both do the same thing. Except one does it in three
days, and the other lingers and lingers and lingers. But which is
worse? The ones that linger are the ones that spread the most.''

In essence, the long years of experimentation have served as a sort
of Darwinian evolutionary contest, in which virus writers have
gradually figured out the best strategies for survival.

Given the pace of virus development, we are probably going to see
even nastier criminal attacks in the future. Some academics have
predicted the rise of ''cryptoviruses'' -- malware that invades your
computer and encrypts all your files, making them unreadable. ''The
only way to get the data back will be to pay a ransom,'' says Stuart
Schechter, a doctoral candidate in computer security at Harvard. (One
night on a discussion board I stumbled across a few virus writers
casually discussing this very concept.) Antivirus companies are
writing research papers that worry about the rising threat of
''metamorphic'' worms -- ones that can shift their shapes so
radically that antivirus companies cannot recognize they're a piece
of malware. Some experimental metamorphic code has been published by
Z0mbie, a reclusive Russian member of the 29A virus-writing group.
And mobile-phone viruses are probably also only a few years away. A
phone virus could secretly place 3 a.m. calls to a toll number,
sticking you with thousand-dollar charges that the virus's author
would collect. Or it could drown 911 in phantom calls. As Marty
Lindner, a cybersecurity expert at CERT/CC, a federally financed
computer research center, puts it, ''The sky's the limit.''

The profusion of viruses has even become a national-security issue.
Government officials worry that terrorists could easily launch
viruses that cripple American telecommunications, sowing confusion in
advance of a physical 9/11-style attack. Paula Scalingi, the former
director of the Department of Energy's Office of Critical
Infrastructure Protection, now works as a consultant running disaster-
preparedness exercises. Last year she helped organize ''Purple
Crescent'' in New Orleans, an exercise that modeled a terrorist
strike against the city's annual Jazz and Heritage Festival. The
simulation includes a physical attack but also uses a worm unleashed
by the terrorists designed to cripple communications and sow
confusion nationwide. The physical attack winds up flooding New
Orleans; the cyberattack makes hospital care chaotic. ''They have
trouble communicating, they can't get staff in, it's hard for them to
order supplies,'' she says. ''The impact of worms and viruses can be
prodigious.''


This new age of criminal viruses puts traditional malware authors in
a politically precarious spot. Police forces are under more pressure
than ever to take any worm seriously, regardless of the motivations
of the author.

A young Spaniard named Antonio discovered that last fall. He is a
quiet 23-year-old computer professional who lives near Madrid. Last
August, he read about the Blaster worm and how it exploited a
Microsoft flaw. He became intrigued, and after poking around on a few
virus sites, found some sample code that worked the same way. He
downloaded it and began tinkering to see how it worked.

Then on Nov. 14, as he left to go to work, Spanish police met him at
his door. They told him the anti-virus company Panda Software had
discovered his worm had spread to 120,000 computers. When Panda
analyzed the worm code, it quickly discovered that the program
pointed to a site Antonio had developed. Panda forwarded the
information to the police, who hunted Antonio down via his Internet
service provider. The police stripped his house of every computer --
including his roommate's -- and threw Antonio in jail. After two
days, they let him out, upon which Antonio's employer immediately
fired him. ''I have very little money,'' he said when I met him in
December. ''If I don't have a job in a little time, in a few months I
can't pay the rent. I will have to go to my parents.''

The Spanish court is currently considering what charges to press.
Antonio's lawyer, Javier Maestre, argued that the worm had no
dangerous payload and did no damage to any of the computers it
infected. He suspects Antonio is being targeted by the police, who
want to pretend they've made an important cyberbust, and by an
antivirus company seeking publicity.

Artificial life can spin out of control -- and when it does, it can
take real life with it. Antonio says he did not actually intend to
release his worm at all. The worm spreads by scanning computers for
the Blaster vulnerability, then sending a copy of itself to any open
target. Antonio maintains he thought he was playing it safe, because
his computer was not directly connected to the Internet. His
roommate's computer had the Internet connection, and a local network -
- a set of cables connecting their computers together -- allowed
Antonio to share the signal.

But what Antonio didn't realize, he says, was that his worm would
regard his friend's computer as a foreign target. It spawned a copy
of itself in his friend's machine. From there it leapfrogged onto the
Internet -- and out into the wild. His creation had come to life and,
like Frankenstein's monster, decided upon a path of its own.


Clive Thompson writes frequently about science and technology. His
last article for the magazine was about mobile-phone culture.

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company

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